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he had a right to testify but that he was
under no obligation to do so. Additionally, the defendant was told that if he did
not testify, it would not be held against

him.
Determined t') speak in his own defense,
Martin took the stand and offered his side
of the story. Martin stated that he was
"helping a friend move some furniture and
was unaware that the syringe was in the
truck." Id. at 600, 535 A.2d at 952-53. On
cross-examination, the prosecution attempted to impeach Martin's credibility
by revealing a prior conviction for the
possession of marijuana with the intent to
distribute. Apparently unpersuaded by
Martin's testimony, the jury found him
guilty and the court sentenced him to four
years in prison.
On appeal, the issue was whether the
advice and warning given were so inadequate in apprising the appellant of his fIfth
amendment
right
against
selfincrimination that a prejudicial error was
committed. Martin contended that hiS
right against self-incrimination was violated because his election to testify was not
based on a knowing and intelligent waiver.
Specifically, he argued that as a pro se
defendant, the trial court had a duty to
inform him that "(1) if he took the witness
stand, he could be impeached, and (2) the
jury would be instructed as to the presumption of innocence if he elected not to
testify." Id. at 600, 535 A.2d at 953. Thus,
the more narrow question was whether
the lack of such knowledge deprived the
defendant of his ability to make an informed and intelligent waiver of his right
against self-incrimination.
The court of special appeals viewed the
issue presented as one which essentially
involved a question of balancing a pro se
criminal defendant's right to be sufficiently informed and the need to avoid imposing an onerous burden on the trial court.
Thus, while it is necessary to provide an
unrepresented defendant with sufficient
.advice to insure that an election to testify
is voluntary and informed, the trial judge
has no obligation to serve as defense counsel. As noted, "[tlhe question then
becomes, how much should the court say?
How far should the court go?" Id. at 601,
535 A.2d at 953.
In Ste'Oens '0. State, 232 Md. 33, 192 A.2d
73 (1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 886 (1963),
the Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized that "[mlost jurisdictions ... have
held that failure by a trial court to advise
a defendant not represented by counsel of
his right to refuse to take the witness stand
constitutes prejudicial error." Id. at 39,192
A.2d at 77 (citing 79 A.L.R. 2d 643 (1961)
and cases therein). The reason this require-

ment is imposed upon the trial court is to
protect a defendant's ftfth amendment
right to be free from compulsory selfincrimination. As stated in State '0. McKen·
zie, 17 Md. App. 563, 593, 303 A.2d 406,
422 (1973), unrepresented "[dlefendants
should not be called to the stand by the
prosecutor or the judge; nor should they
be led to believe that they are required or
expected to take the stand."
Thus, to call a pro se defendant to the
witness stand without informing him of
his right to refuse to testify constitutes
reversible error. To avoid such error, it is
essential that the defendant waive his privilege against self-incrimination. Furthermore, in that the privilege against
self-incrimination is a fundamental constitutional right, the waiver must be a knowing and intentional one. Johnson '0. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Curtis '0. State,
284 Md. 132, 143, 395 A.2d 464, 470
(1978). The gist of the Johnson rule is that
for a waiver to be valid, the defendant
must be reasonably aware of what protection the right involves and must voluntarily choose to forego that protection. It is
clear then, that when a defendant chooses
to testify on his own behalf, he waives his
fIfth amendment right only if he has sufficient knowledge as to the meaning of such
a wavier. Without sufficient knowledge,
the defendant cannot make a voluntary
and intelligent decision to forego the protection and safeguards afforded by the
right. Thus, where a defendant is not
assisted by counsel, it is incumbent upon
the court to insure that his decision to testify is an informed and voluntary one.
In the instant case, the trial judge simply
informed the defendant that he had a right
to remain silent and that if he chose to
exercise that right, it would not be held
against him. The court of special appeals
afftrmed the lower court and refused to
require that pro se defendants should be
warned of the perils of cross-examination
and impeachment. In order to address
both the interests and rights of pro se
defendants and the obligations imposed
upon a trial judge, the court concluded
that a minimum amount of advice was all
that was required. The court explained its
holding as follows:
Trial judges are commanded by both
Constitutionally-based case law and
spedftc rules of procedure (see Md.
Rule 4-215) to inform unrepresented
defendants of their right to counsel, to
encourage them to obtain counsel, and
to warn them of the hazards of proceeding without counsel. H a defendant knowingly and voluntarily elects
to disregard that advice and proceed

without counsel, he cannot expect the
judge to become his lawyer. Informing
him that he has a right not to testify
and that no inference of guilt can be
drawn if he exercises that right sufftces, we think, to allow him to make
an intelligent-if not a wise-decision
whether to testify• To go further, however, might involve the court, however
subtle, in influencing that decision.

Martin, at 603,535 A.2d at 954.
The information which a trial judge
must provide to a pro se defendant is now
clear. Once the minimum required warnings are given, however, the unrepresented
defendant who elects to take the stand will
be deemed to have voluntarily executed a
valid waiver of his right against compulsory self-incrimination.

-Gerard M. Waites

Prout v. State: WITNESS' PRIOR
CONVICTIONS OF CRIMES
INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE
NOT ADMISsmLE FOR
IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES
In Prout '0. State, 311 Md. 348, 535 A.2d
445 (1988), the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that prior convictions of a
witness may be admissible for impeachment purposes only if the conviction was
for either an infamous crime or a lesser
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crime which bears upon the witness' credibility. In reaching its holding, the court affirmed a decision of the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City which refused to admit
proof of a witness' convictions of prostitution and solicitation for prostitution (solicitation) for impeachment purposes.
In Prout, Lewis D. Prout, the appellant,
was charged with assault and robbery with
a deadly weapon. Subsequent to the selection of the jury, Prout's counsel made a
motion in limine to advise the court of his
intention to cross-examine the complainant, the state's sole witness, regarding her
prior convictions. Id. at 351, 535 A.2d at
446. Specifically, Prout's counsel sought to
cross-examine the complainant for her
convictions of grand theft, shoplifting,
prostitution, failure to appear in court, solicitation, resisting arrest, violation of probation, and contempt of court. Id. The
state objected to the motion in limine stating that "there was nothing in the complainant's record to indicate that the
offenses listed therein resulted in convictions." Id. at 352, 535 A.2d at 447.
Upon the trial judge's questioning, the
prosecutor admitted that he was uncertain
whether the aforementioned offenses
resulted in actual convictions. Accordingly, the trial judge decided that he would
not permit any evidence for impeachment
purposes of any prior offenses which did
not result in convictions. The judge stated
further that he would allow the complainant to be cross-examined about her theft
and shoplifting charges if it was shown
that she was in fact convicted for these
offenses. The judge cautioned, however,
that
[if] it turns out that this woman has
been convicted of theft and shoplifting ... , then on cross-examination
when you ask her about her prior convictions, do not ask her what she has
been convicted of. Lead her and say,
"Is it not true that you have been convicted of theft and shoplifting?" et cet·
era, so ... we will not inadvertently
get into other inadmissable convictions.

Id. at 353, 535 A.2d at 447.
During the trial, Prout's counsel crossexamined the complainant by asking her
leading questions about her grand theft
and shoplifting convictions but neither
proffered nor mentioned her prostitution
and solicitation convictions. Id. The jury
found Prout guilty of assault and Prout appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland. In an unreported per curiam
opinion, the court of special appeals affirmed the decision of the circuit court.

Id. (citing Prout

't'. State, No. 79, September Term, 1985; filed September 23, 1985).
The court of appeals then granted certiorari to both parties to review the questions presented in the case.
On appeal, Prout's counsel asserted that
the trial court erred in excluding the complainant's prostitution and solicitation
convictions for impeachment purposes,
maintaining that the crimes involved
"moral turpitude" and, therefore, the trial
judge was without discretion to exclude
them. Id. at 354, 535 A.2d at 448. The issue
presented before the court was whether
prior convictions, allegedly involving
moral turpitude, are admissible per se for
impeaching the credibility of a witness.
The court of appeals addressed this issue
by looking at the legislative history of impeachment by prior conviction in
Maryland. At common law, the court
noted, an individual convicted of an infamous crime was completely disqualified
from testifying. In an attempt to eliminate
the harshness of this common law rule, the
Maryland General Assembly enacted
Chapter 109 of the Acts of 1864 which is
now embodied in Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc.
Code Ann. § 10-905 (1984). See Prout at
359, 535 A.2d at 450. This statute provides
in pertinent part that "[e]vidence is
admissible to prove ... the fact of [a
witness'] conviction of an infamous
crime." Id. at 358-59, 535 A.2d at 450.
Thus, while a witness convicted of an infamous crime is no longer disqualified from
testifying, his testimony is subject to impeachment by his conviction of an infamous crime.
Upon reviewing the legislative history of
Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 10-905,
the court concluded that "the legislative
purpose behind Maryland's impeachment
statute requires that the crimes admissible
per se. .. be limited to those crimes within
the
common
law
definition
of
infamous' ". Prout, at __, 535 A.2d at
~ At common law, only "treason,
felony, perjury, forgery and those other
offenses classified generally as crimen falsi"
were considered infamous. Id. at 360, 535
A.2d at 450. (citing Garitee 't'. Bond, 102
Md. 379, 383, 62 A. 631, 633 (1905». In
regard to Prout's moral turpitude argument, the court of appeals stated that the
label "moral turpitude" serves no purpose
for impeachment purposes in the context
of § 10-905 other than acting as an adjective describing those crimes that "our society finds particularly repugnant." Id. at
360, 535 A.2d at 451. The court held,
therefore, that the phrase "moral turpitude" does not provide another class of
crimes separate and apart from infamous
crimes under Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code
Ann. § 10-905 (1984). Furthermore, the

court noted that no Maryand case concerning impeachment by prior conviction
accorded any significance to the term
"moral turpitude" until Ricketts 't'. State,
291 Md. 701, 436 A.2d 906 (1981). See Pro·
ut, at 361-62, 535 A.2d at 451.
In Ricketts, the trial court allowed the
prosecutor to impeach Ricketts' testimony
with his prior conviction for indecent
exposure.Id. at 362, 535 A.2d at 451. On
appeal, Ricketts' asserted that under
Maryland law, only infamous crimes,
crimes of moral turpitude and lesser crimes
affecting the credibility of the witness
were admissible for purposes of impeachment. Id. Ricketts argued that because his
indecent exposure conviction did not fall
into any of these categories, the trial court
erred in allowing the state to use his prior
conviction against him for impeachment
purposes. Id.
In response to Ricketts' argument, the
court of appeals held that a previous conviction for purposes of impeachment need
not be limited to infamous crimes or those
involving moral turpitude but could also
include convictions for a lesser crime if the
convictions bear on the witness' credibility. Id. at 362, 535 A.2d at 452 (citing
Ricketts, at 707-08,436 A.2d at 909-10) (emphasis added». Unfortunately, in its effort
to be thorough, the court of appeals in
Ricketts, by its own admission, "grafted
onto the [impeachment] statute the concept of a crime of moral turpitude." Id. at
362-63, 535 A.2d at 452. However, upon
re-examining the legislative history of Md.
Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 10-905
(1984), the Prout court concluded that the
legislature had no intention of creating a
class of infamous crimes known as crimes
of moral turpitude. Id. at 363, 535 A.2d at
452. As a result, the court overruled Rick·
etts to the extent that it was inconsistent
with its holding in Prout. The court then
upheld the circuit court's refusal to allow
Prout's counsel to impeach the complainant by her convictions for prostitution
and solicitation, finding that such convictions were not for infamous crimes but
rather for lesser crimes, the admissibility
of which was within the discretion of the
trial judge.
Thus, the Prout court makes clear that a
prior conviction is admissible per se for
impeachment purposes if it was a conviction for an infamous crime at common law
(i.e., a felony or a crimen falsi), whereas, a
lesser crime may be used for impeachment
purposes only if it reflects on the witness'
truthfulness and veracity, the determination of which is to be left to the sound discretion of the trial judge.

-Mark Scott Ledford
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